BP Plc’s in-house analysis of the Deepwater Horizon debacle blames its own men for misinterpreting data prepared while finishing the oil well, including the wrong pressure data that signaled a blowout was impending, according to a person known about the situation.
BP administrators aboard the Transocean Ltd.-owned engineer misread the investigation of the Macondo well’s constancy on April 20, making a decision that the test indicated the well was in good shape, said the person known with the facts, but stayed anonymous as the report’s findings haven’t been publicized.
This positive analysis of the investigated data cleared the way for rig workers to initiate drilling liquid in the well, which is heavier than oil and natural gas, with salt water.
The salt water was lighter than natural gas to prevent it from leaking into the well from bombarding the pipe to the rig, where it busted and slaughtered 11 workers. The dented well ultimately churned out more than 4 million barrels of crude oil into the sea, sufficient enough to fill two supertankers.
A federal investigative panel including U.S. Coast Guard officers and Interior Department controller has concentrated on how BP employees on board the rig and in Houston proved futile in detecting signals that the well was about to explode.
The survey also has raised questions why engineer John Guide, the team leader supervising the venture, overlooked cautions of a possible blowout from outworker Halliburton Co., and why rig-based executives ignored the test for faults in the cement outside the well premeditated to prevent explosive natural gas from trickling up to the rig.
Keep Up-To-Date
